Last Tuesday, a Dallas district court judge granted a motion for new trial in a case involving a motor vehicle accident caused by an alleged unlicensed, intoxicated driver (Defendant Villarreal) and the alleged negligent entrustment of the vehicle’s owner (Defendant Hudson) — for Defendant Hudson.
The decision comes after a jury verdict in favor of the Plaintiff with damages amounting to ~$1.65 million, a denied motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a final judgment affirming said verdict, and an appearance of, and pleadings by, additional counsel for Defendant Hudson.
– DETAILS –
1. Jury Finds In Favor of Plaintiff
On November 8, 2024, after a four-day trial, 10 out of 12 members of the jury reached a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff, answering:
- “Yes” to Question 1 as to the negligence of Defendant Villarreal proximately causing the injuries to Plaintiff;
- “Yes” to Question 2 as to Defendant Hudson negligently entrusting his vehicle to Defendant Villarreal since he “knew or should have known [Villarreal] was an unlicensed driver”; and
- The following sums of money to fairly and reasonably compensate the Plaintiff in response to Question 3:
a. Physical pain (past): $50,000
b. Physical pain (future): $50,000
c. Mental anguish (past): $50,000
d. Mental anguish (future): $50,000
e. Physical impairment (past): $50,000
f. Physical impairment (future): $50,000
g. Medical expenses (past): $381,270.91
h. Medical expenses (future): $450,00
i. Loss of earnings (past): $140,000
j. Loss of earnings (future): $380,000
2. Defendant File’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV)
On November 18, 10 days after the verdict, Defendant Hudson filed Defendant Hudson’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (“Defendant’s 1st JNOV“) stating said Motion is legally proper when “there is no evidence of an element of a plaintiff’s claim” and “the law does not permit reasonable jurors to decide otherwise.” Defendant focused primarily on arguing two issues Plaintiff failed to prove:
- 1) “that the same risk that caused Hudson’s entrustment to be negligent also caused the accident at issue,” and
- 2) “that Villarreal driving while intoxicated was a natural and probable result of the entrustment.”
In point 1, Defendant argued that Plaintiff “skipped a step” in that there was a fatal lack of connection between Villarreal driving unlicensed and that being the cause of Plaintiff’s injuries; Defendant claimed the evidence, “instead” showed that it was “Villarreal’s driving while intoxicated [that] caused Plaintiff’s injuries.”
In point 2, Defendant focused on the fact that Hudson, who loaned Villarreal his vehicle so Villarreal could “respond to a family emergency” could not “reasonably anticipate” that Villarreal would end up later driving while intoxicated.
In her response filed on November 22, Plaintiff argued Defendant Hudson “fail[ed] to meet the no evidence standard” for granting a JNOV, citing precedent that “all evidence must be considered in a light most favorable to the party whose favor the verdict has been rendered” and the jury in this case — the ‘exclusive judge’ of the evidence — concluded that both Defendants were negligent.
Plaintiff also argued that a key precedent Defendant relied on (Schneider v. Esperanza Transmission Co., 744 S.W.2d 595, 596 (Tex. 1987) was “misinterpret[ed]” and another precedent (Mundy v. Pirie-Slaughter Motor Co., 206 S.W.2d 587, 588 (1947) is actually “the leading authority pertaining to proximate cause in negligent entrustment cases.”
Finally, Plaintiff pointed out that the Texas Supreme Court “observes that an entrusted is responsible for a driver’s liability” and the Dallas Court of Appeals further notes that “once negligent entrustment is established ‘the owner/employer is liable for the acts of the driver, and the degree of negligence of the owner/employer is of no consequence’.”
3. Judge Denies Defendant’s Motion & Signs Final Judgment
Following a hearing on the issue on December 16, the presiding judge issued an Order Denying Defendant’s 1st JNOV.
On January 17, the presiding judge signed a Final Judgment in the case, stating: “It appears to the Court that the jury returned its 10-2 verdict in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants [Villareal] and [Hudson]. The jury found both [Villarreal] and [Hudson] negligent.”
The Judge “ordered, adjudged and decreed” that both Defendants are “jointly and severally” liable for:
- Past damages of $671,270.91;
- Future damages of $980,000.00;
- Interest on past damages at the rate of 7.75% simple interest, from the date of suit to Judgment date, totaling $151,388.37 (and $142.51 per day after the Judgment date);
- Post-judgment interest at a rate of 7.75% per annum, compounded annually, from the Judgment date until the Judgment is satisfied;
- Taxable costs of court; and
- All writs and processes for the enforcement and collection of the Judgment.
4. Defendant Hires Additional Counsel and Files Motion to Set Aside, 2nd Motion for JNOV, & Motion for New Trial
On the evening of February 14, Defendant Hudson simultaneously filed 1) a Notice of Appearance of Additional Counsel, 2) Defendant Galen Wade Hudson’s Motion to Set Aside Adverse Jury Finding and Second Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (“Defendant’s Set Aside & 2nd JNOV”), and 3) Defendant Galen Wade Hudson’s Motion for New Trial (“Defendant’s Motion for New Trial”). These pleadings included three additional counsel for Defendant Hudson who were from a new firm–along with Hudson’s original counsel–and was signed by one of the new counsel.
a) Set Aside/2nd JNOV
Defendant’s Set Aside & 2nd JNOV asked the court to “disregard the adverse liability finding in Question 2, render judgment that Plaintiff take nothing against Hudson, and modify the Final Judgment accordingly.” The Defendant took several issues with the jury charge/verdict form, including, that:
- The jury was not asked to find, and did not find, that Hudson’s alleged negligent entrustment of the vehicle was a proximate cause of the collision.
- The verdict form did not include a comparative fault question and Texas law “requires a jury to determine percentage of fault when a tort case has more than one defendant”
- Since there was no comparative fault, the Court issued an “unsupported finding of joint and several liability” in the Final Judgment, for which there was “no legal or factual basis”
In addition to the jury charge issues, Defendant highlighted several insufficiencies in the case, arguing further that:
- The evidence was “legally insufficient” to establish negligent entrustment because:
- Hudson did not know Villarreal did not have a license;
- Hudson’s entrustment was not a proximate cause of the collision; and
- A “new and independent cause” broke any connection between the entrustment and collision
- The evidence was “legally insufficient” to support the jury’s money damages in Question 3
b) New Trial
In Defendant’s Motion for New Trial, these issues were re-iterated and expanded to fit within the context of them warranting a new trial. Defendant added, to the list of verdict form issues, the fact that a “new and independent cause” instruction was, also, wrongly omitted. Defendant re-emphasized its contention that the facts did not support a finding of negligent entrustment, and went through the monetary damages item-by-item (Question 3, a-j) to show factual insufficiency.
In addition, Defendant took issue with “numerous improper–and incurable–arguments” Plaintiff’s counsel allegedly made to the jury during closings that “confus[ed] the issues by insinuating a non-applicable higher standard of care for Hudson.”
In conclusion, Defendant’s counsel argued that a new trial is “warranted in the interest of justice,” that the Final Judgment “should be set aside” and “at the very least [Defendant Hudson] is entitled to a new trial, or alternatively, the damages must be eliminated in whole or part, drastically reduced, or a remittitur ordered.”
5. Court Grants Defendant’s Motion for New Trial
Defendant’s three Motions were heard on March 25. On the same day, the presiding judge signed an Order Granting Defendant Galen Wade Hudson’s Motion for New Trial “based on the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the Jury’s answers to Question 3.”
As of the time of publishing this article, it is unclear whether the judge will sign Defendant’s proposed order explicitly vacating its January 17 Judgment.
– CASE INFO –
County:
Dallas
Court:
134th District Court
Judge Presiding:
Hon. Dale Tillery
Cause #:
DC-22-01998
Caption:
Gloria Myers v. John Andrew Villarreal, Galen Wade Hudson, and Texas Farm Bureau Insurance
Claims:
Negligence, Negligent Entrustment of a Motor Vehicle, Underinsured Motorist Payment Entitlement
Counsel for 𝛑:
George (Tex) Quesada and James (Mick) Kennedy of SOMMERMAN, McCAFFITY, QUESADA & GEISLER, LLP
Counsel for 𝝙:
Carlos A. Balido of WALTERS BALIDO & CRAIN, LLP
Jessica Z. Barger, E. Marie Jamison, and Emily C. Freeman of WRIGHT CLOSE & BARGER, LLP